Known limitations
Embrilo is in beta, and its encryption has not yet been independently audited. This page says plainly what it protects, what it does not, and what is known to be weak. It is a summary of the technical list in protocol.md, section 13, which goes to the auditors and will be published with the source code. Written in P6.5 (November 2026) from that list.
What is protected
- Messages, group names, files, calls, availability and what you are playing are end-to-end encrypted, with Messaging Layer Security (MLS, RFC 9420) for conversations and SFrame (RFC 9605) for voice. Our server passes them on and cannot read them.
- Nobody new reads old messages. Someone added to a group sees only what is said after they join. Someone removed cannot read what comes after.
- There is no unencrypted fallback. If encryption cannot be set up, sending or joining fails with an error; it never goes ahead unprotected.
- Your friends' keys are checked. You can compare safety numbers with a friend and mark them verified; if a verified friend's key changes, the app tells you and does not quietly accept it.
- Updates are signed. The app installs only updates signed with our release key, so whoever controls the server cannot make your PC run something else.
What the server can still see
Encryption hides what you say, not who you say it to. The server sees:
- who is friends with whom, who sent friend requests, and who blocked whom;
- which accounts share each group, who owns and moderates it, and in what order members joined;
- who is in a call with whom, when, and, for the voice relay, each device's internet address while it is in the call;
- when each device is online, sends, fetches and uploads, and roughly how large each message and file is (sizes are padded to hide the exact length);
- that someone is typing in a conversation right now (not what), and which friends someone shares availability with while they do.
We keep as little of this as we can, for as short a time as we can: the Privacy Policy lists it all.
Weaknesses we know of
- A dishonest server could cause trouble in groups. It cannot read or fake messages, but it could let someone remove members they should not be able to, hold back or reorder messages, split a group so that members stop seeing each other, or hide from a device that one of your PCs was signed out. Every change to a group is shown in the conversation ("bob added carol"), and apps refuse changes that do not match what their sender declared.
- Linking a new PC trusts the screen. Whoever sees the link code on a new PC's screen, or a dishonest server, could link that PC to their own account instead of yours. Only link PCs you control, and do not show the code to anyone.
- Key checking is not complete. The public key log can catch a server that shows different keys to different people, but it cannot yet prove that a key it shows is the newest one. For the strongest assurance, compare safety numbers with your friends in person or on a call.
- Every PC of an account holds its main key. Signing out a lost or stolen PC stops it receiving new messages, but whoever has it still holds the account's identity key, which cannot be changed yet. If you use Backup, such a PC could also read later backups with the server's help.
- Old keys are kept a little longer. So that a bad change to a group can be undone, each PC keeps the group's previous keys for up to a day (up to 7 if it is offline). Someone who steals a PC in that window can read a few more recent messages than MLS alone would allow.
- Sessions last 7 days, and the app has no sign-out button yet; signing a PC out from another one ends them.
- The voice relay sees addresses. Everyone in a call connects to our relay, so the people in the call never see each other's internet addresses, but the relay does. A dishonest relay working with someone in the call could misattribute who said what, though neither could hear it.
- Release notes are not signed, only the update itself. A dishonest server could change the text shown with a genuine update, or hold updates back.
- The Windows installer is not code-signed yet. Windows SmartScreen warns about it ("Windows protected your PC": More info, then Run anyway), and on a PC with Smart App Control on, Windows will not run it at all. Signing is planned.
- Files can carry hidden details. Photos lose their location before sending, but videos, HEIC photos, PDFs and documents can carry where and when they were made, or an author's name; the app asks before sending those as they are.
- Link previews are off by default. Turned on, your PC fetches the linked page, so that website sees your internet address.
- Reports are readable. When you report someone, we keep what you chose to send for 90 days, and up to 15 days more in our server backups.
- Deleting your account keeps your handle reserved, and the public key log keeps its entries; our server backups keep the account up to 15 days.
- Crash reports you choose to send are cleaned of personal details by rules that can miss a short value; you see the whole report before it goes.
- Our hosting company can read the server's disk: the records listed above, never your messages.
What no messenger can protect you from
- a PC that has been taken over, by malware or by someone with access to it;
- the people you talk to keeping, copying, photographing or recording what you send them;
- an observer who can watch large parts of the internet and match up traffic patterns.
Reporting a problem
If you find a security problem, tell us first at contact@digitalden.so, and give us time to fix it before telling others.